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Abstract 
Online collaborative platforms have emerged as a complementary approach to traditional 
organizations for coordinating the collective efforts of creative workers. However, it is surprising 
that  they  result  in  any  productive  output  as  individuals  often  work  without  direct  monetary 
incentives while collaborating with unknown others. In this paper, we distinguish the conditions 
necessary for eliciting effort from those affecting the quality of interdependent teamwork. We 
consider the role of incentives versus social processes in catalyzing collaboration. We test our 
hypotheses using a unique data set of 260 individuals randomly assigned to 52 teams tasked with 
developing  working  solutions  to  a  complex  innovation  problem  over  10  days,  with  varying 
monetary incentives. We find that levels of effort are driven by cash incentives and the presence 
of other interacting teammates. The level of collaboration, by contrast, was not sensitive to cash 
incentives. Instead, individuals increased their communication if teammates were also actively 
participating.  Additionally,  team  performance  is  uniquely  driven  by  the  level  of  emergent 
interdependence, as indexed by the diversity of topics discussed and the temporal coordination of 
activity in short focused time periods. Our results contribute to the literature on how alternative 
organizational forms can be designed to solve complex innovation tasks.  
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Organizing workers into teams is an enduring feature of most organizations (Jackson, 
Joshi, & Erhardt, 2003). Across a wide range of activities, from effort-based manual labor to 
creative problem solving (Hackman, 2011, Hamilton, Nickerson, & Owan, 2003, Wuchty, Jones, 
& Uzzi, 2007), executives and managers deploy teams of workers to collectively accomplish 
tasks. Teams have been shown to be effective in tackling a wide range of task types and are 
superior to individual work under certain circumstances (Lazer & Friedman, 2007). Teams have 
a  particular  advantage  of  integrating  diverse  knowledge  of  members  and  leveraging 
complementarities. However, extant literature also shows that teams require the right mix of 
incentives and coordination to accomplish tasks (Gardner, 2012).  
While  traditionally  the  organizational  literature  has  focused  on  the  factors  explaining 
team success inside formal and established organizations (Ilgen et al., 2005, Haas, 2010), more 
recently, alternative online organizational forms have emerged (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007, 
Dahlander & O’Mahony, 2011, Yochai Benkler, 2013). These online “organizations” are now a 
major engine for knowledge development in a variety of domains (Kittur & Kraut, 2008). Many 
online  platforms  involve  collaboration  and  coordination  among  members  to  reach  common 
goals,  rather  than  just  isolated  actions  by  individual  members.  In  this  sense,  they  are 
“collaborative communities” (Murray & O’Mahony, 2007, Seidel & Stewart, 2011). For example, 
open source software development communities routinely coalesce into working groups who 
interact via online communication. While a large fraction of these projects fall fallow, those that 
have  been  successful  have  led  open  source  communities  to  become  a  mainstream  mode  of 
software production. Analogously, groups of “modders,” who build novel online video games by 
modifying existing commercial game platform engines, join into small teams interacting largely 
via online channels to complete their projects. These small transitory teams regularly form and 
disband, producing sophisticated game software along the way. Further, it is now possible for 
online labor markets, such as oDesk, to assemble teams within virtual workspaces to work on a 
software  development  project—as  opposed  to  simply  contracting  jobs  out  to  individuals. 
Contributions  to  Wikipedia  also  involve  community  members  working  virtually  within  sub-
communities,  in  which  multiple  parties  establish  a  consensus  narrative  around  a  given 
encyclopedic entry or topic (Faraj, Jarvenpaa, & Majchrzak, 2011).  
It might at first seem remarkable that these sorts of contexts sustain any level of effort 
and collaboration necessary for “collective intelligence” to emerge at all (Woolley et al., 2010). 
This is particularly so, given participation on these platforms is primarily voluntary with easy 
entry  and  exit  through  permeable  organizational  boundaries  (O’Mahony  &  Ferraro,  2007). 
Individuals often begin as utter strangers to one another, often from different parts of the world 
(Preece & Shneiderman, 2009). Moreover, these strangers are meant to work in a context lacking 
interactive  interpersonal  richness,  having  few  explicit  commitment  mechanisms,  missing 
management oversight, and often lacking wider social context or socialization. The projects are 
also often transitory or short-lived. Thus the baseline conditions for any sort of collaboration and 
team  effort  towards  a  collective  joint  goal  seem  sparse  at  best  and  potentially  fraught  with 
failure. And yet, it is becoming increasingly common to observe large-scale mobilization of   2 
workers  in  these  settings,  incorporating  thousands  of  projects  and  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
workers (Benkler, 2006, von Krogh & von Hippel, 2006, O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007, Faraj, 
Jarvenpaa, & Majchrzak, 2011). 
What triggers and transforms the anonymous “crowd” into productive collaborators? Is it 
possible  to  reliably  elicit  effort  and  collaboration  among  groups  of  strangers  over  online 
platforms so that they can be transformed into teams, absent the scaffolding of the traditional 
firm? And is it necessary for such groups to develop the high levels of emergent interdependence 
that characterizes successful teams in traditional organizations?  
In this paper, we attempt to discern the basic ingredients behind successful online team 
collaborations  outside  the  firm.  In  particular,  we  examine  and  attempt  to  distinguish  the 
conditions  necessary  for  eliciting  effort  from  those  affecting  the  quality  of  team  products. 
Specifically,  we  consider  two  leading  views  in  the  elicitation  of  effort:  first,  the  view 
predominant  in  economics,  which  links  participation  and  effort  levels  to  the  presence  of 
incentives; and second, a more socially orientated view of team interactions and productivity 
predominant to research on organizational behavior that links the level of participation to the 
perceived participation of others. We examine how these distinct sets of factors shape not only 
effort choices, but the extent of interactions and the collaborative style of work, as proxied by 
communication patterns. Apart from examining triggers of effort and interaction as such, we also 
evaluate evidence on how the emergence of collaboration relates to performance in terms of 
quality of the solutions developed. We do so via two important factors affecting the quality of 
team products—namely, the range and diversity of the information team members share with 
each other in their collaborative work (Crawford & Haaland, 1972, Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 
2007, Uzzi et al., 2013) and the temporal coordination evident in team members' contributions 
(Montoya-Weiss,  Massey,  &  Song,  2001).  Both  of  these  factors  are  integral  pieces  of  the 
emergent interdependence that distinguishes co-acting groups from truly interdependent teams 
(Wageman & Gordon, 2005, Caruso & Woolley, 2008, Hackman, 2011) with the latter being the 
locus of true innovation in face-to-face contexts (Hackman, 2011). 
This  paper  presents  results  from  a  field  experiment  in  which  260  elite  algorithm 
developers  were  randomly  assigned  to  52  teams  of  five.  Each  team  was  given  the  goal  of 
creating a solution to a complex innovation problem posed by the US National Aeronautic and 
Space Administration (NASA) over the course of 10 days, through collaboration on an online 
platform. Teams were challenged with developing a computer program and algorithm to help in 
planning space mission parameters for astronaut health and safety. While prior research has been 
constrained to the use of observational data for studying teams in these environments, we take 
advantage of this unique setting to randomize the assignment of individuals to teams, and to 
randomly assign cash incentives, so as to allow us to draw causal inferences. The problem at 
hand  and  its  implementation  on  the  online  platform  also  enabled  us  to  obtain  an  objective, 
computer-derived measure of team performance by creating a quality score for each submission 
and to also get fine-grained measures of individual and team activity. This includes measures of   3 
effort,  communication  (frequency,  timing,  content),  and  participants’  prior  problem-solving 
performance. 
In our analysis, we find that while cash incentives (a cash prize of $1,000) have a clear 
effect  on  effort  levels  (roughly  doubling  hours  worked)  cash  incentives  did  not  produce 
significant increases in collaboration across team members. Nor did it even affect the likelihood 
that an individual would choose to participate at all. The effect focused only on the choice of 
continuous level of effort. Cash incentives do not appear to transform the nature work mode or to 
be sufficient to produce truly interactive collaborative on their own. Regarding socially emergent 
processes, we find evidence of a virtuous circle of effort and collaborative interactions taking 
place.  The  likelihood  an  individual  chooses  to  participate  relates  to  levels  of  teammates’ 
communications and communications among teammates begot more communications and more 
effort. These patterns of reciprocating complementarities are consistent with the importance of 
setting productive social interactions and dynamics into motion in order to catalyze collaboration 
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985, Ginnett, 1993, Ericksen & Dyer, 2004), even in this rather 
weak social context.  
Our second major finding regarding the performance heterogeneity among teams reveals 
that high levels of emergent interdependence are in fact important, even in this sparse social 
context.  This is revealed by the importance of two key factors: the diversity of information 
exchanged  within  a  team  and  the  level  of  temporal  coordination  within  the  team,  and  the 
connections of both factors with performance. On the one hand, we find that an increase in the 
diversity  of  information  discussed  by  team  members  is  correlated  with  improved  solution 
performance,  which  points  to  the  salience  of  encouraging  diversity  in  team-based  problem 
solving settings. On the other hand, we also find that temporal coordination of team activity, i.e., 
the degree to which team members concentrated their communication and work effort during 
relatively contained time periods, despite variance in time zones, versus spreading them out over 
time, was linked to higher solution performance. Both diversity of information and temporal 
coordination of work remained significant predictors of performance even when controlling for 
the influence of cash incentives and the skill level of individual contributors, which were not 
significant.  Hence  absent  a  centralized  manager  or  an  appointed/assigned  leader,  success  at 
online collaboration is particularly sensitive to the conditions enabling collective intelligence to 
develop within the team.  
External Online Collaboration and Teams  
The  appeal  of  making  use  of  external  online  collaborations  is  high  and  growing 
(O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007). Online contests and peer production communities provide the 
possibility  of  benefiting  from  a  broader  array  of  expertise  and  resources  than  any  one 
organization can reasonably house (Jeppesen & Lakhani, 2010, Boudreau & Lakhani, 2013). 
However, we also know that online communities experience a relatively high level of attrition 
and failure (Butler et al., 2005), suggesting that, as with traditional organizations, they need to 
address the issues of motivation and coordination.    4 
At the most fundamental level, external online collaborations need to offer some sort of 
incentives to individuals for the elicitation of effort towards a common shared goal (Lerner & 
Tirole, 2005). However, as the extant literature on online collaboration has shown, the scope for 
incentives is quite broad with a variety of both explicit and implicit rewards for participation 
(Lakhani & Wolf, 2005, von Krogh et al., 2012). Beyond incentives for active participation and 
the exertion of effort, research on teams in general has shown that shared task accomplishment is 
highly dependent on a virtuous cycle of ongoing participation by other team members, i.e., active 
and visible participation by one member will beget more participation by others (Frey & Meier, 
2004).  Thus,  ongoing  participation  by  any  one  individual  will  be  highly  sensitive  to  visible 
participation by others and either a cascade of conditional cooperation will take hold or teams 
may not gel if other members fail to reciprocate. 
A second issue to resolve in external online collaboration is the level of interdependence 
that should characterize work. Online communities often function best with problems or tasks 
that  can  be  modularized  and  completed  less  interdependently  (Olson  &  Olson,  2014). 
Independence  (as  opposed  to  interdependence)  of  ideas  and  contributions  often  lead  to  the 
highest levels of creativity (Paulus, 2000) and a broader sample of solutions from which to select 
(Nelson, 1959, Surowiecki & Silverman, 2007). However, in organizational settings, teams that 
operate  with  a  lower  level  of  interdependence  than  is  optimal  often  underperform  more 
collaborative  teams  (Hackman,  2011).  The  ideal  combination  is  a  high  level  of  diversity  of 
information,  coupled  with  the  high  levels  of  integration  that  can  be  accomplished  through 
interdependent collaboration. Therefore, one of the primary reasons to deploy teams to solve 
problems is the ability to solicit and integrate a diverse range of knowledge inputs to the problem 
at hand (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001, Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily, 2004, Gibson & Gibbs, 
2006,  Pieterse,  van  Knippenberg,  &  van  Dierendonck,  2012,  Shin  et  al.,  2012).  Indeed  the 
secular rise of teams over individuals in conducting scientific and academic exploration has been 
attributed  to  the  necessity  of  integrating  various  knowledge  domains  to  solve  the  current 
problems facing most scientific disciplines (Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007, Jones, 2009). Thus 
from a process perspective, teams that can uncover and traverse a greater diversity of knowledge 
topics may have higher chances of creating high performing solutions as opposed to those that 
are narrowly focused (Uzzi et al., 2013).  
Beyond encouraging effort and participation by individual members and ensuring that the 
appropriate diversity of contributions are provided and integrated, online collaborations are faced 
with the challenge of coordinating activity of the various members and ensuring that the inputs 
provided by the members are sufficient to effectively solve the problem at hand (Gibson & 
Gibbs, 2006). The coordination of team activity has been a central concern for the literature on 
teams and has been shown to be an important factor in explaining team performance, especially 
in dispersed teams (Espinosa et al., 2007, Robert, Dennis, & Ahuja, 2008, O’Leary & Mortensen, 
2010). This concern for coordination is even more severe in external collaborative settings as the 
traditional managerial and leadership hierarchy may not necessarily be immediately available (or 
even sought after) to guide the various activities of the individuals (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007,   5 
Dahlander  &  O’Mahony,  2011,  Dahlander  &  Frederiksen,  2012).  Absent  such  explicit 
managerial oversight, a range of self-managing coordination practices may be needed to achieve 
collective task coherence and performance (O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007).  
We turn next to describing more fully our hypotheses regarding the effects of incentives 
and social processes on member effort and interactions in these online settings. 
Incentives and Levels of Effort and Activity of Online Collaborators  
A cornerstone of economic theory is that workers respond to incentives (Lazear, 2000). 
Monetary incentives are the core foundation to induce high levels of effort in traditional firms 
(Prendergast, 1999, Lazear, 2000). The use of pricing and payments has also been the area of 
greatest emphasis within past research for strategically manipulating adoption and effort around 
a platform (Rochet & Tirole, 2006, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2012). At the same time, research on 
the role of worker incentives in innovation—often outside of research on platforms—has begun 
to illustrate a more nuanced effect around incentives in creative processes. For example, they 
may not always produce desired effects in creative problem-solving tasks (e.g., Manso, 2011). 
Further they can at times crowd out non-cash based motivations (e.g., Frey & Jegen, 2001), 
which  are  especially  important  in  the  case  of  creative  problem-solving  work  (e.g.,  Stephan, 
1996). 
The starting point in comprehending team production, in particular, within economics is 
that  team  production—while  leveraging  the  complementarity  of  skills  between  workers—is 
subject to free riding (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972, Lazear & Shaw, 2007). When it is difficult for 
an employer to identify and reward the exact contribution made by each employee to the team 
output, employees working in a team will typically lack incentives to provide the optimal level of 
effort and work less than if they were working alone. This instance of the familiar ‘moral hazard’ 
problem – inducing agents to exert optimal amount of effort when effort cannot be observed and 
contracted for directly – has been the subject of a theoretical literature starting with Holmstrom 
(Holmstrom,  1982).  These  baseline  models  of  teams  and  collaboration  from  economics  and 
social psychology would each suggest online collaboration, particularly by anonymous workers 
outside of an employment relationship, should produce moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1982) and 
social loafing (Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 1979). However, despite the risk of free riding, 
monetary incentives have been shown to be effective in settings where output measures are not 
the outcome of the inputs of a single individual but rather derive from the joint contribution of 
many individuals, when compared to alternative mechanisms such as incentive schemes that are 
not tied to output measures at all (Prendergast, 1999). Further, online platforms should also be 
particularly subject to selection effects; online team production could attract individuals of any 
number of characteristics and inclinations—including those having greater inclination to free 
riding  (Kerr  &  Bruun,  1983).  Therefore,  while  as  a  baseline  we  should  expect  that  cash 
incentives produce higher effort, their effectiveness is an empirical question and will depend 
upon possible offsetting effects of crowding out of alternative motivations, fundamental limits of 
team incentives, and the effects of worker selection processes.   6 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Individuals’ effort on an online platform will increase with 
cash incentives.  
The  presence  of  monetary  incentives  does  not  preclude  the  presence  of  alternative 
motivations. In fact, we often do observe online contexts where sustained efforts are observed in 
the absence of cash incentives, as were mentioned in the Introduction. This is in particular due to 
individuals responding diverse and heterogeneous sources of motivation (von Krogh et al., 2012, 
Algan et al., 2013, Benkler, 2013). The puzzle of motivations has been resolved by pointing to 
the  many  conspicuous  non-monetary  motivations  experienced  by  those  participating  on 
collaborative peer production contexts. This includes direct, intrinsic motivations and any direct 
benefits from the use of any innovations by the contributor, him or herself (Lakhani & Wolf, 
2005). It also includes a range of what might be regarded as “socially-oriented” motivations, fed 
by the presence of other participants on the platform (Lakhani & Wolf, 2005) These motivations 
include such things as an interest in gaining affiliation with the larger team as a community, or of 
accruing status or signaling one’s expertise to the community (Butler et al., 2005, Lakhani & 
Wolf,  2005,  Lerner  &  Tirole,  2005).  Further,  evidence  suggests  that  rather  than  necessarily 
attracting loafers, a collaborative context may simply attract those who prefer collaboration and 
will work relatively diligently in these contexts (Boudreau, Lacetera, & Lakhani, 2011). Online 
collaboration contexts, particularly those that provide immediate feedback about the quality of 
work, encompass the job characteristics most directly associated with internal motivation (i.e., 
variety of content, autonomy over how work is conducted, and knowledge of results; (Hackman 
& Oldham, 1976) which are not dependent on the presence of cash incentives to elicit sustained 
effort.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Individuals will exert effort and make contributions on an 
online platform even in the absence of cash incentives.  
Norms, Reciprocity, and Conditional Cooperation 
Research in economics suggests that contributions to public goods are difficult to explain 
by  a  narrow  self-interest  hypothesis  (Fischbacher,  Gächter,  &  Fehr,  2001).  Rather,  recent 
theories focus on “conditional cooperation” in which people are assumed to be more willing to 
contribute  when  others  contribute  (Axelrod  &  Dion,  1988,  Frey  &  Meier,  2004).  This  is 
consistent  with  work  in  social  psychology  on  conformity,  social  norms  (Bettenhausen  & 
Murnighan, 1985, Messick, 1999), guilt aversion (Chen & Lim, 2013), and reciprocity (Rabin, 
1993) which observe that collaboration and other pro-group behaviors often develop in feedback 
loops  leading  to  self-fueling  spirals  (Lindsley,  Brass,  &  Thomas,  1995).  These  explanations 
depart from alternative explanations based on altruism, in which case helping behavior should 
decrease when it is perceived that help is supplied by others (Clotfelter, 1997). In particular, the 
theory of conditional cooperation predicts higher contribution rates when information is provided 
about other’s contributions. More specifically, individuals may underestimate others’ tendencies 
to contribute in the absence of information, and thus reduce their own contributions, but in 
response to evidence of others’ contributing to a greater degree than expected, increase their own 
contributions accordingly (Frey & Meier, 2004).   7 
A remarkable feature of online collaborative platforms in particular is the extent to which 
collaboration  emerges  from  sophisticated  team  processes  that  evolve  organically  (Murphy, 
2004),  rather  than  direct  architecting,  governance  or  “ordering”  by  platform  owners  or 
“community  managers”  (Boudreau  and  Hagiu,  2009).  This  process  has  been  referred  to  as 
"emergent interdependence" in research on more traditional teams (Wageman & Gordon, 2005, 
Caruso & Woolley, 2008), where individuals have some level of autonomy in influencing the 
intensity  of  interaction,  as  is  very  much  the  case  in  voluntaristic  at-will  collaborations  on 
permeable online platforms. Whether interdependent activities and informal governance appear 
should  then  necessarily  depend  upon  the  degree  to  which  behaviors  and  even  ideas  are 
observable  and  shared  across  group  members  (Cramton,  2001,  Cramton  &  Hinds,  2005). 
Therefore,  individuals’  engagement  in  collaborative  effort—where  it  occurs  at  all—should 
generally intensify with time and growing number of interactions. This leads to the hypothesis 
that team engagement will influence the collaboration trajectory and assert a large impact on 
team participation and team effort relative to other sources of influence, i.e., cash incentives. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Individuals’ collaboration on an online platform will increase 
with the presence and increased effort of other participants, independent of cash 
incentives. 
Diversity of Information Shared, Temporal Coordination, and Performance 
Many  online  platforms  are  formed  for  the  purpose  of  amassing  a  diverse  array  of 
independent or even mix-and-matchable contributions, such as mobile software applications on 
an  apps  market  platform  or  product  reviews  on  an  opinions  platforms  (Boudreau,  2012). 
However, other online platform contexts are oriented to building solutions to problems in which 
contributions, knowledge and expertise of multiple parties is to be integrated and combined, as in 
models of collaborative communities and peer production (Y. Benkler, 2006, Haythornthwaite, 
2009, Yochai Benkler, 2013). We posit that the synergistic gains to be obtained through true 
team emergent interdependence and collaboration online will be a strong predictor of solution 
quality.  Here  we  draw  a  distinction  between  the  exertion  of  effort,  and  the  qualitative 
transformation  to  ongoing  collaborative  performance  in  the  sense  of  effort  involving 
collaboration with other contributors working on a platform. Thus, here we focus on the divide 
between whether individuals continue to work in parallel in mostly independent work (Hackman, 
2011)  or  instead  begin  to  interact  and  gradually  structure  collaborative  and  interdependent 
activities, and the quality of work those collaborations produce. In examining this in online 
groups,  we  focus  on  two  key  hallmarks  of  emergent  interdependence:  (1)  the  amount  and 
diversity of information shared (Crawford and Haaland, 1972; Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 
2009), and (2) the temporal coordination of communication and activity while conducting work 
(Thompson, 1967; Wageman, 1995) 
The  preponderance  of  the  evidence  available  in  the  extant  literature  on  collaboration 
suggests that higher levels of emergent interdependence will lead to higher quality solutions to 
complex, multi-faceted problems (Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007, Gardner, 2012, Uzzi et al., 
2013), even despite the loss of divergence in ideas that may occur as a result of interaction   8 
(Paulus, 2000) so long as the team shares a diverse range of information. One of the primary 
reasons to deploy teams to solve problems is the ability to solicit and integrate a diverse range of 
knowledge inputs into a problem solution (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001, Reagans, Zuckerman, 
& McEvily, 2004, Gibson & Gibbs, 2006, Pieterse, van Knippenberg, & van Dierendonck, 2012, 
Shin  et  al.,  2012).  Ample  evidence  has  documented  a  strong  correlation  between  access  to 
information-rich networks, and superior work performance (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992, Burt, 
1992, Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001, Zaheer & Bell, 2005, Aral, Brynjolfsson, & Van Alstyne, 
2012). Network structure is often used as a proxy for information flow because the structure of 
information flow can be measured more easily than the content of the actual information flow 
(Burt, 2008). Unfortunately, the vast majority of empirical work on networks and information 
advantage is “content agnostic” (Hansen, 1999). However, network positions may not adequately 
capture information flow as information exchange may occur strategically, for example, when 
individuals do not share all available information (Aral & Van Alstyne, 2011). Consequently, 
there has been a call to open the black box that uses characteristics of network nodes as a proxy 
for information content and rather investigate the content itself (Burt, 2008, Wu, 2013).  
Organizational researchers have demonstrated that increasing teams’ exposure to diverse 
information  can  enhance  performance,  especially  on  tasks  requiring  creativity  (Bantel  & 
Jackson, 1989, McLeod, Lobel, & Cox, 1996, Austin, 1997). Access to diverse information is 
also  positively  associated  with  individual  performance.  This  inference  has  guided  the  way 
sociologists think about information flow in networks, and has motivated and informed empirical 
studies  of  innovation  (Hargadon  &  Sutton,  1997,  Burt,  2004),  academic  output  (Swedberg, 
1991),  team  performance  (Reagans  &  Zuckerman,  2001,  Lazer  &  Friedman,  2007),  the 
formation  of  industry  structures  (Walker,  Kogut,  &  Shan,  1997),  the  success  of  social 
movements (Centola & Macy, 2007) and labor market outcomes (Montgomery, 1991). Tasks 
that require developing alternatives or creating plans of action are likely to benefit especially 
from access to knowledge and abilities that are diverse, because that diversity can lead to a 
greater quantity of ideas (Larson, 2010, Lewis & Herndon, 2011) and also non-redundancy of 
ideas or perspectives in the group (Levine & Moreland, 2004).  
Hypothesis  4  (H4):  Beyond  initial  contributions,  information  diversity 
characterizing  team  communications  will  be  a  strong  predictor  of  team 
performance in an online platform (controlling for individual skill level and cash 
incentives).  
The recombination and integration of inputs in online platforms, by their nature, should 
benefit from some higher level of coordinated activity across individual contributors (Malone & 
Crowston, 1994, Thompson, 2003, Hackman & Wageman, 2005). Thus coordination becomes 
another  factor  shaping  productivity,  apart  from  simply  attracting  capable  contributors  and 
motivating  their  efforts.  For  this  reason,  the  history  of  online  collaborative  platforms,  for 
example, stresses the use of enabling technologies and processes that simply reduce coordination 
costs. Particularly relevant here have been standardized tools, technical languages and interfaces, 
and enabling communications technologies (Preece & Shneiderman, 2009).   9 
Despite  the  widespread  availability  of  coordination  tools,  however,  we  know  that 
coordinating efforts across widely distributed collaborators remains a major challenge (O’Leary 
&  Cummings,  2007).  Many  have  lauded  the  availability  of  online  tools  for  enabling  the 
asynchronous  coordination  of  efforts  and  have  found  that  online  teams  can  be  even  more 
effective than face-to-face teams (Sharda, Barr, & McDonnell, 1988) while others have found 
that  online  teams  could  not  outperform  traditional  teams  (Warkentin,  Sayeed,  &  Hightower, 
1997, McDonough, Kahnb, & Barczaka, 2001) , or that there are no differences between the two 
types of teams (Galegher & Kraut, 1994, Burke & Aytes, 1998, Burke & Chidambaram, 1999). 
One  of  the  trickier  aspects  of  coordinating  groups  online  is  managing  the  flow  of 
communication.  Human  communication  has  been  shown  to  have  rich  temporal  structure 
(Barabasi, 2005). Although temporal patterns can be partially attributed to circadian and weekly 
rhythms (Malmgren et al., 2008), detailed analysis has shown that they have more fundamental 
origins (Karsai et al., 2012). In particular, human communication is known to be intrinsically 
bursty  (Barabasi,  2005,  Goh  &  Barabási,  2008)  and  contain  strong  pairwise  correlations  of 
interaction  times  (Karsai  et  al.,  2012).  The  temporal  patterning  of  activities  is  an  important 
aspect of team effectiveness in any environment (McGrath, 1991). Synchronous interaction is an 
orderly process wherein verbal and nonverbal cues help regulate the flow of conversation, enable 
turn  taking,  provide  feedback,  and  convey  subtle  meanings.  In  lean,  asynchronous 
communication environments, the communication of cues is hindered, feedback is delayed, and 
interruptions or long pauses in communication often occur (McGrath, 1991) which are difficult 
to interpret (Cramton, 2001). In an asynchronous discussion, typically many topics are active at 
the same time, with team members making contributions at different times, possibly on different 
topics.  This  pattern  can  increase  information  overload  and  may  reduce  the  synergy  of  team 
members  if  there  are  no  links  among  the  responses.  In  addition,  long  time  lapses  between 
communication events can lead to discontinuous and seemingly disjointed discussions (Ocker et 
al., 1995, Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001). This discussion suggests that a significant 
challenge facing online teams is coordinating the temporal patterns of group behavior (McGrath, 
1991,  Warkentin,  Sayeed,  &  Hightower,  1997)  which  has  been  shown  to  be  critical  to 
performance (Gersick, 1989, Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001). 
Consistent with existing research on temporal patterning in teams, we expect that in an 
online  environment  the  temporal  coordination  of  contributions  to  a  shared  product  will  be 
important  to  facilitating  the  collaboration  necessary  to  a  high  level  of  performance  in  an 
otherwise sparse communication environment.  
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The temporal coordination of activity within teams will be a 
strong predictor of their performance in an online platform. 
     10 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SETTING 
Investigating  the  drivers  of  emergent  online  collaborations  is  fraught  with  several 
empirical  and  methodological  challenges.  First,  given  the  heterogeneity  of  projects  that  are 
pursued  in  online  settings  (from  creating  software,  music,  videos,  to  writing  encyclopedia 
entries) it is important to ensure that the basis for comparison is limited to the factors impacting 
online collaborations and not so much driven by differences between projects. Second, since 
participation in many of these projects is non-random, important considerations like the effect of 
incentives on participation and individual ability and skills on project performance need to be 
factored into the study design. Also, participation and performance metrics across projects need 
to be directly comparable to ensure that appropriate inferences are drawn from the data. It is for 
these reasons we choose to implement the study in a field experimental setting that enabled us to 
obtain fine-grained measures and to employ randomized assignment.  
The experiment was conducted over a ten day long online event held on the TopCoder 
open software innovation platform
1, where participants developed computational algorithms to 
optimize the Space Flight Medical Kit, of the Integrated Medical Model Team at NASA. The 
TopCoder  platform  provides  a  ready-made  infrastructure  to  host  complex  programming 
challenges  and  has  a  well  developed  ratings  and  skills  assessment  system  that  enables  the 
identification of the ability of any competitor. Virtual workspaces were assigned to each team to 
enable messaging and communications and to enable code development. During the time of the 
competition we were then able to take detailed and objective measures of effort, communication, 
and performance. 
We  randomly  assigned  the  260  registered  participants  to  groups  of  five  to  create  52 
randomly-formed  teams.  Groups  of  four  teams  (20  individuals)  were  randomly  assigned  to 
virtual rooms to compete against one another. We randomized cash incentives across rooms. A 
total of 24 teams competed for a cash prize of $1,000 and 28 rooms competed for $0. (The 
precise  split  was  determined  by  the  size  of  our  prize  budget  in  relation  to  the  number  of 
participants signing up.) The awards in this case were team-based prize incentives, in that they 
would be shared across the five team members. For groups for which there was a cash prize, we 
anonymously polled the members of each team via a simple online questionnaire, immediately 
following the experiment and prior to the announcement of results. The questionnaire asked them 
to allocate a percentage of the $1,000 to themselves and the other team members. Awards were 
based  on  the  average  allocation.  Strong  correlations  between  allocations  and  observable 
measures of effort and contributions suggest the mechanism captured meaningful variation and 
achieved our mean goal here of simply being “good enough” to provide a working allocation 
mechanism. It should also be emphasized that the particular institutional set-up implemented 
here involved not just collaboration and team work, but teams competing with other teams. This 
distinction  was  not  relevant  within  the  earlier  theory-development.  Members  of  the  highest 
scoring team in the entire exercise (i.e., across all rooms) were also awarded a NASA Launch 
                                                 
1 TopCoder is a platform for algorithm and software development contests with over 600, 
000  registered  members.  A  variety  of  public,  private,  and  government  organizations  use   11 
Invitation  where  each  of  the  five  members  of  the  highest-scoring  team,  if  active,  would  be 
eligible to receive an invitation from NASA to view a NASA space shuttle launch (participants 
had to pay their own expenses to get to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida). Furthermore, all 
contestants who actively participated received a contest T-shirt.  
NASA and TopCoder collaborated with us in developing the appropriate test suite to 
generate  an  objective  score  for  innovation  problem  solving  performance  which  included 
generating 100,000 flight scenarios which were used in testing solutions. In addition, TopCoder 
worked with us to make various changes to their system and their website so that we could run 
controlled field experiments in their setting. For example, the platform was changed such that 
each team not only observed its own score, but could observe the scores of competing teams 
within their room on an ongoing basis (i.e., the highest score solution submitted up that that 
point). 
The  problem  being  solved  is  not  just  representative  of  a  typical  (highly-challenging) 
development problem; it is in fact a real computational-engineering problem whose solution is to 
be  used  by  NASA.  The  selected  problem  required  the  development  of  a  robust  software 
algorithm, which would recommend the ideal components of the space medical kit, which is 
included in each space mission. As mass and volume are restricted in space flight, the medical kit 
has to be designed in a way so that as many expected and unexpected medical contingencies as 
possible can be met through the resources in the kit while in space. Otherwise the mission is 
aborted. The medical kit also has to be attuned to the characteristics of the space flight and crew. 
Hence, the challenge was to develop a software algorithm, based on mission characteristics that 
would minimize mass and volume of the medical kit and yet have the resources so that the 
likelihood of a medical evacuation is also minimized. 
Participants’ inclination toward initiating collaboration might be expected to be higher in 
this  experimental  collaboration  setup  than  would  be  the  case  in  a  naturally  occurring 
collaboration problem, for a number of reasons. First, we have solved the basic coordination 
problem of selecting prospective teammates, leaving just the decision of whether to collaborate 
or not to the participants. Second, participants have self-selected into the contest and have some 
inclination of the possibility of working in groups. Third, the platform, itself, is not a case of a 
newly-formed platform but rather an established online community of software and algorithm 
developers. So we are looking at the coalescence of groups of collaborators on a platform, rather 
than the genesis of a broader community. However, our experimental tournament was the first 
tournament on the TopCoder platform to involve teamwork. Prior to that point, all tournaments 
were designed as competitions between individuals. 
The individuals who participated in this exercise were those who chose to respond to our 
open  call  to  members  of  the  platform.  The  participants  were,  to  some  extent,  aware  of  the 
possibility of working in groups, but this was not the central message of our post. We stressed 
that this would be a competition to solve a challenging algorithmic design problem. The usual 
mode of interaction on this platform was in the form of individuals competing with one another 
to solve such problems. It was only in the course of the exercise that we randomly selected this   12 
subset  to  be  randomly  assigned  to  teams.  Inasmuch  as  individuals  self-selected  to  join  this 
contest we should expect they might have already indicated some probability of being willing to 
participate  in  the  exercise  in  general  and  in  the  possibility  of  joining  a  group  to  work,  in 
particular. In this sense, we might expect the participation levels we observe in this context to 
perhaps be high in relation to what might be expected in a case in which an online platform 
attempts to encourage its members to coalesce into productive work groups under more typical 
operating conditions. 
Methods and Variables 
In this section we detail how we constructed the main variables used in our empirical 
analysis and the methods used for analysis. In particular, we outline the automated text analysis 
used  to  construct  our  measure  of  information  diversity  and  the  approach  used  to  index  the 
temporally correlated heterogeneous behavior of activity. 
Dependent  Variable  –  Effort.  We  measured  individuals’  effort  through  a  post-
experiment online survey in which we asked them to report the hours they spent working on the 
problem assignment. While this has some of the drawbacks associated with self reports, our 
analysis shows that the measure is highly correlated with the number of submission attempts 
made and submission quality.. 
Dependent  Variable  –  Number  of  Communications.  Participants  interacted  on  the 
platform through a web-based interface screen, as in typical operation. This screen included a 
workspace where they could read the problem statement, perform algorithm development (i.e., in 
the  form  of  software  coding;  a  number  of  software  languages  were  possible),  and  submit 
solutions for compilation. Further, individuals could communicate with other participants within 
their  group  via  a  bulletin  board.  That  is,  individuals  could  engage  in  general  or  directed 
communications  to  other  group  members  by  virtue  of  the  content  of  their  messages  but 
communications  were  observable  on  a  posting  “board”  or  online  forum  visible  to  all  group 
members (but not visible to other groups). Such a posting board was familiar to the platform as a 
general posting and discussion forum tool. Number of communications is indexed as the number 
of messages sent to the group message board.  
Dependent Variable – Team Score. At the end of the competition, the last submission 
of each team (irrespective of which individual made the submission) undergoes final system 
testing to determine an objective performance score of the algorithm. The score is an objective 
measure of the quality of the algorithm that a team has developed. The score is computed as a 
function  of  the  mass  and  volume  of  the  medical  kit  (lower  is  better)  and  the  number  of 
evacuation scenarios that can be averted with the medical kit (higher is better). Team score is 
measured on the team level. 
Process Variable – Information Diversity. To index the effects of information diversity on 
team performance, we perform automated content analysis of all messages sent within each 
team. We perform the usual preprocessing of eliminating stop words and stemming. Stop words 
are common words such as articles (“a”, “an”, “the”) and prepositions (e.g., “from”, “of”, “to”). 
Stemming reduces words to their root; for example, “running” is recorded as its root, “run”.   13 
Furthermore, we removed numbers from the text and restricted our text analysis to word stems of 
at least two characters in length. We then perform content analysis using latent Dirichlet 
allocation (LDA) to classify content into distinct topics using a Gibbs sampler. LDA is an 
advanced statistical technique that is widely used in information retrieval and machine learning. 
It is a generative probabilistic model that allows modeling the topics of a corpus of documents.
2 
Each topic consists of a vector of words that are statistically related to each other. For example,  
Table 1 shows four sample topics from a LDA topic model of 100 topics for a dataset of 
2,246  news  feeds  from  the  Associated  Press.  The  topic  “Agriculture”  has  words  including 
farmers, food, drought, and corn. Similarly, the topic “Politics” includes words such as party, 
government, opposition, and elections.  
 
Table 1. Four Sample Topics from a 100-Topic LDA Model of Associated Press News Feeds
3 
 
 
LDA classifies topics in two distinct steps. In the first step, the entire corpus of all team 
messages is used to discover the entire distribution of topics. In the second step, each individual 
message is assigned probabilities for each topic. This gives for each message a distribution over 
topics, which are most likely to have generated that message. We use LDA to model 100 topics 
using  the  entire  corpus  of  all  1,741  team  messages  (after  preprocessing,  1,705  non-empty 
documents  with  5,853  terms  remain).  The  exact  number  of  topics  used  for  the  LDA  topic 
modeling matters little. We find almost identical results using a wide number of topics, ranging 
from 50 to 150. We then compute information diversity for each team as the average cosine 
dissimilarity of the topic space of each team’s messages. This is a common measure, which is 
widely  adopted  in  information  retrieval  research  to  measure  diversity  of  information. 
Specifically, we measure a team i'’s information diversity DI through a normalized, squared sum 
                                                 
2 Given a document corpus, LDA models each document d as a finite mixture over an 
underlying set of topics, where each topic t is characterized as a distribution over words. A 
posterior Dirichlet parameter g(d; t) can be associated with the document d and the topic t to 
indicate the strength of t in d. For details of the algorithm, please refer to (Blei, Ng, & Jordan, 
2003). 
3 D. Harman (1992) Overview of the first text retrieval conference (TREC-1). In Proceedings of 
the First Text Retrieval Conference (TREC-1), 1–20. 
5 Information Diversity
I created a measure of information diversity taken from Aral and van Alstyne The DiversityBandwidth Tradeo↵ (2011) and Wu (2013,
ISR).
The basic idea is to calculate a measure of diversity of the information content within the electronic communication of an individual
and within a team. I use LDA topic modeling to model 100 topics using the entire corpus of all messages posted during the competition.
The usual preprocessing is used (stemming, stop words removal, removing of numbers, removing of punctuation, restrict to words of at
least 3 character length) (1741 messages in corpus, after preprocessing, 1705 non-empty documents with 5853 terms remain). Information
diversity is then calculated as the average cosine dissimilarity of the topic space in a team’s messages. (precisely, I calculated two version
of the measure, one measures the cosine distance from all messages sent within a team from the mean topic vector representing all
messages sent within the team; For the second measure, it measures individual i’s information diversity by summing the cosine distance
between the topic vectors coming from allotter team members (T4) to the mean topic vector representing all T4 messages.
IDi
t =
PN
j=1(1   Cos(dI
ij,MI
i ))2
N
(2)
IDi
t =
PN
j=1(1   Cos(dI
ij,MI
i ))2
N
(3)
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bus farmers party company
radio farm government o↵er
o cials food political stock
driver agriculture opposition billion
spokesman tons elections share
greyhound agricultural minister deal
drivers drought communist inc
truck production leader corp
stopped corn national sale
bridge prices president sell
For example, Table 1 shows three sample LDA topics for the 16 abstracts of articles published in ASQ in volume 57 (2012). The
topic Management has words including CEO, employees, performance, and teams. Similarly, the topic Development includes words such
as career, role, change, and organizational. Table 1 Three sample topics from a ten-topic LDA model of ASQ abstracts from volume 57
(2012; only terms with probability over certain threshold printed).
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of the cosine distance between the topic vectors of each of N messages 𝑑  sent within the team 
and the mean topic vector 𝑀  representing all messages sent within team i. The exact formula is: 
 
Teams that send messages of a rich and diverse set of topics have higher information 
diversity scores than teams that send messages of a more homogenous topic distribution. Similar 
measures of information diversity have been reported, most notably the one used by Aral and 
Van Alstyne (2011). Our measure differs from theirs by applying advanced LDA topic modeling 
techniques rather than support vector machines. 
Process  Variable  –  Burstiness  of  Team  Activity.  To  index  the  coordination  of 
communication  and  code  submissions  within  the  team  we  constructed  a  measure  of  the 
“burstiness”  of  team  activity,  as  a  means  of  capturing  the  degree  to  which  team  members 
concentrated  their  communication  and  work  effort  during  relatively  contained  time  periods 
versus spreading them out over time, leading to a more uniform distribution of wait times in 
between team activity. Specifically, we constructed a measure capturing the bursty nature of 
team activity based on the wait times (in minutes) between each team activity (either sending a 
message to other team members or making a code submission). For each team t we compute a 
coefficient of variation measure B (Goh & Barabási, 2008), defined as the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean of wait times τ between team activities 
 
This measure is meaningful when both the mean and the standard deviation of wait times 
P(τ) exist, which is always the case for real-world finite signals (Goh & Barabási, 2008). B has a 
value in the bounded range (-1, 1), and its magnitude correlates with the signal’s burstiness: B = 
1 is the most bursty signal, B = 0 is neutral, and B = -1 corresponds to a completely regular 
(periodic) signal. Thus, higher values of B correspond to spiked patterns of high team activity, 
while lower values of B correspond to more regular team activity. Since teams did not send the 
same  number  of  messages,  we  compute  a  bootstrapped  null  model  of  B  scores  using  1,000 
random samples for different numbers of messages sent within a team (i.e., what is the expected 
distribution of wait times, and hence of B, for a team that sent N messages?). Based on these 
random null models, we then compute a z-score of B for each team. Figure 1 gives an intuition 
for the measure using completely random and bootstrapped data. 
 
   
5 Information Diversity
I created a measure of information diversity taken from Aral and van Alstyne The DiversityBandwidth Tradeo↵ (2011) and Wu (2013,
ISR).
The basic idea is to calculate a measure of diversity of the information content within the electronic communication of an individual
and within a team. I use LDA topic modeling to model 100 topics using the entire corpus of all messages posted during the competition.
The usual preprocessing is used (stemming, stop words removal, removing of numbers, removing of punctuation, restrict to words of at
least 3 character length) (1741 messages in corpus, after preprocessing, 1705 non-empty documents with 5853 terms remain). Information
diversity is then calculated as the average cosine dissimilarity of the topic space in a team’s messages. (precisely, I calculated two version
of the measure, one measures the cosine distance from all messages sent within a team from the mean topic vector representing all
messages sent within the team; For the second measure, it measures individual i’s information diversity by summing the cosine distance
between the topic vectors coming from allotter team members (T4) to the mean topic vector representing all T4 messages.
IDi =
PN
j=1(1   cos(dj,M i))2
N
(2)
IDi
t =
PN
j=1(1   Cos(dI
ij,MI
i ))2
N
(3)
“Transportation” “Agriculture” “Politics” “Business”
bus farmers party company
radio farm government o↵er
o cials food political stock
driver agriculture opposition billion
spokesman tons elections share
greyhound agricultural minister deal
drivers drought communist inc
truck production leader corp
stopped corn national sale
bridge prices president sell
For example, Table 1 shows three sample LDA topics for the 16 abstracts of articles published in ASQ in volume 57 (2012). The
topic Management has words including CEO, employees, performance, and teams. Similarly, the topic Development includes words such
as career, role, change, and organizational. Table 1 Three sample topics from a ten-topic LDA model of ASQ abstracts from volume 57
(2012; only terms with probability over certain threshold printed).
9
4 Bursty Nature of Communication
In a log-log plot: if points are in a straight line, then that indicates a power-law distribution.
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
α = 1
1e−05
1e−03
1e−01
1e+01
1 100 10000
Response time τ (minutes)
P
(
τ
)
Compute measure of burstiness as (Measure from “Burstiness and memory in complex systems” K.-I. Goh and A.-L. Barabasi):
B ⌘
( ⌧/m⌧   1)
( ⌧/m⌧ + 1)
=
( ⌧   m⌧)
( ⌧ + m⌧)
. (1)
7  15 
Figure 1. Difference Between Activity Patterns  
 
Note: Differences in activity patterns for teams with N = 90 communications with color-coded inter-communication 
times.  Horizontal  axis  denotes  time  (day  of  competition),  each  vertical  line  corresponds  to  an  individual 
communication event. The shorter the time between consecutive communications, the darker the color. a) Sequence 
of regular, Poisson distributed event times which assumes that at any given moment an event takes place with 
probability q. Note that the inter-event times are comparable to each other, long delays are virtually absent (B = 
−0.005); b) Sequence of events for a heavy-tailed (power-law) distribution. Note the very long delay times, followed 
by  bursts  of  activity  (B  =  0.228);  c)  Sequence  of  typical  communication  pattern  for  a  well  coordinated  team, 
showing some longer wait times followed by bursts of activity, especially during the middle of the competition and 
towards the end (B = 0.208); d) Sequence of typical communication pattern for a poorly coordinated team with some 
bursts during the beginning of the competition followed by sparse and regular communication in the second half of 
the competition (B = 0.03). 
 
Control  Variable  –  Skill  Rating.  As  an  objective  measure  of  the  skill  level  of 
competitors, we use TopCoder’s own skill rating based on historical performance of participants 
in TopCoder’s own regular competitions (outside of the experiment). Because skill rating is a 
clear indication of both ability and experience on the TopCoder platform, we are interested in 
examining the effects of the group collaboration patterns observed above and beyond the effects 
of individual skills.  
Control Variable – Collective Team Output. As an additional control measure, we use 
the count of the number of code submissions made by a team as a control for team effort. Prior 
research  has  shown  that  in  tournaments  allowing  repeat  entries,  the  number  of  submitted 
attempts is a strong predictor of performance (Wooten & Ulrich, 2012).  
Control Variable – Number of Time Zones. Research has shown that the dispersion of 
team members across time zones can affect the level of team coordination. For example, teams 
spanning multiple time zones often experience significant challenges coordinating schedules and 
deliverables (Massey, Montoya-Weiss, & Hung, 2003, O’Leary & Cummings, 2007, O’Leary & 
Mortensen, 2010). To control for the effect of temporal dispersion in our teams, we control for 
the number of time zones represented in each team.  
Control  Variable  –  Number  of  Countries.  Research  has  shown  that  compositional 
diversity  with  regard  to  team  members’  cultural  backgrounds  can  affect  team  performance 
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d)  16 
(Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily, 2004, Gibson & Gibbs, 2006, O’Leary & Mortensen, 2010). 
To control for the effect of cultural diversity in our teams, we control for the number of different 
countries represented in each team.  
The  260  competitors  came  from  50  different  countries  with  more  than  50%  of  the 
competitors coming from four countries: India (18%), China (13%), USA (12%), and Russia 
(9%). Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics for the main variables on the individual- and 
team-level, respectively.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables on Individual-Level 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables on Team-Level 
 
 
   
5 Descriptives
Mean SD Min Max ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 )
HoursWorked ( 1 ) 8.86 15.64 0.00 100.00
NumCommunications ( 2 ) 3.18 10.59 0.00 116.00 0.44***
Rating ( 3 ) -0.04 0.86 -1.88 4.32 0.18** 0.22***
GroupCashIncentive ( 4 ) 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.21*** 0.02 0.10
Number of active members, other 4 ( 5 ) 1.85 1.15 0.00 4.00 0.19** 0.25*** 0.00 0.26***
HoursWorked, Other 4 ( 6 ) 35.45 36.15 0.00 153.00 0.19** 0.26*** 0.08 0.37*** 0.70***
NumComms, Other 4 ( 7 ) 12.71 28.38 0.00 221.00 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.12 0.03 0.49*** 0.57***
NumTimeZones, Other 4 ( 8 ) 3.26 0.75 1.00 4.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.16** 0.14* 0.12 0.03
NumCountries, Other 4 ( 9 ) 3.49 0.65 1.00 4.00 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.52***
Mean SD Min Max ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 )
GroupCashIncentive ( 1 ) 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Team HoursWorked ( 2 ) 44.32 42.41 0.00 153.00 0.40**
Team NumSubmissions ( 3 ) 12.02 15.05 0.00 76.00 0.34* 0.73***
Team NumCommunications ( 4 ) 15.88 34.26 0.00 222.00 0.03 0.60*** 0.55***
Team MeanRating ( 5 ) -0.04 0.36 -0.78 0.66 0.24 0.32* 0.42** 0.40**
Team Score ( 6 ) 4170.53 3351.06 0.00 8952.79 0.27 0.69*** 0.73*** 0.45*** 0.42**
Team NumTimeZones ( 7 ) 3.85 0.96 2.00 5.00 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.00 -0.08 0.06
Team NumCountries ( 8 ) 4.19 0.84 2.00 5.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.52***
Information Diversity ( 9 ) 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.31* 0.62*** 0.10 -0.05
Burstiness (z-score) ( 10 ) 1.99 2.21 -1.89 8.46 0.12 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.75*** 0.44** 0.67*** -0.03 -0.25 0.74***
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5 Descriptives
Mean SD Min Max ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 )
HoursWorked ( 1 ) 8.86 15.64 0.00 100.00
NumCommunications ( 2 ) 3.18 10.59 0.00 116.00 0.44***
Rating ( 3 ) -0.04 0.86 -1.88 4.32 0.18** 0.22***
GroupCashIncentive ( 4 ) 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.21*** 0.02 0.10
Number of active members, other 4 ( 5 ) 1.85 1.15 0.00 4.00 0.19** 0.25*** 0.00 0.26***
HoursWorked, Other 4 ( 6 ) 35.45 36.15 0.00 153.00 0.19** 0.26*** 0.08 0.37*** 0.70***
NumComms, Other 4 ( 7 ) 12.71 28.38 0.00 221.00 0.22*** 0.40*** 0.12 0.03 0.49*** 0.57***
NumTimeZones, Other 4 ( 8 ) 3.26 0.75 1.00 4.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 0.16** 0.14* 0.12 0.03
NumCountries, Other 4 ( 9 ) 3.49 0.65 1.00 4.00 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.52***
Mean SD Min Max ( 1 ) ( 2 ) ( 3 ) ( 4 ) ( 5 ) ( 6 ) ( 7 ) ( 8 ) ( 9 )
GroupCashIncentive ( 1 ) 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
Team HoursWorked ( 2 ) 44.32 42.41 0.00 153.00 0.40**
Team NumSubmissions ( 3 ) 12.02 15.05 0.00 76.00 0.34* 0.73***
Team NumCommunications ( 4 ) 15.88 34.26 0.00 222.00 0.03 0.60*** 0.55***
Team MeanRating ( 5 ) -0.04 0.36 -0.78 0.66 0.24 0.32* 0.42** 0.40**
Team Score ( 6 ) 4170.53 3351.06 0.00 8952.79 0.27 0.69*** 0.73*** 0.45*** 0.42**
Team NumTimeZones ( 7 ) 3.85 0.96 2.00 5.00 0.19 0.12 0.25 0.00 -0.08 0.06
Team NumCountries ( 8 ) 4.19 0.84 2.00 5.00 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 -0.15 0.03 -0.05 0.52***
Information Diversity ( 9 ) 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.56*** 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.31* 0.62*** 0.10 -0.05
Burstiness (z-score) ( 10 ) 1.99 2.21 -1.89 8.46 0.12 0.63*** 0.65*** 0.75*** 0.44** 0.67*** -0.03 -0.25 0.74***
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RESULTS 
The Impact of Cash Incentives 
We begin by examining the effects of the presence and absence of monetary incentives on 
individuals’ behaviors.  
Figure  2  shows  the  distribution  of  HoursWorked  and  NumCommunications  with  and 
without cash incentives. It shows that cash incentives substantially statistically increased the 
likelihood  of  participating  (HoursWorked  >  0  hours)  from  39%  to  54%,  while  also  quite 
resolutely shifting the distribution of effort rightward (difference significant at p < .05). This 
explicit depiction shows no such dramatic effect on communications (although it is possible to 
see the small and insignificant effect with a slightly higher but statistically insignificant share of 
individuals choosing to make at least one communication). 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of Effort (left) and Number of Communications (right) by Cash Incentive 
Treatment 
 
 
We report OLS results with clustered standard errors (using the team-of-five as the grouping 
level). In  
Table 4, Model (1) beings by simply regressing our measure of effort, HoursWorked, on 
the CashIncentive dummy with a constant. The estimated constant is 5.78 hours (p < .001) — 
indicating  that,  on  average,  even  in  the  absence  of  monetary  incentives  individuals’  exerted 
considerable effort (roughly a half hour per day of the competition). This is evidence of ample 
non-monetary  motivations,  which  supports  Hypothesis  2.  The  estimated  coefficient  on 
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CashIncentive is 6.68 hours (p < .001), meaning that the presence of a cash incentive more than 
doubled the average effort exerted, supporting Hypothesis 1. 
We then turn to analogous regressions in which the number of communications becomes 
the dependent variable, replacing the hours worked (Model 2) — thus providing us with a more 
direct sense of interactive activity among team members. Consistent with the earlier results, 
individuals interact and communicate significantly, even in the absence of cash incentives. This 
is shown by the constant term of 3.01 (p < .1), which is the average number of communications 
per individual in the absence of cash incentives. However, in stark contrast to the effect on effort, 
the  average  number  of  communications  does  not  statistically  differ  in  teams  given  the  cash 
incentive. The coefficient is positive (𝗽 = .37) but not statistically significant.  
 
Table 4. OLS Regressions of Individual Activity on Cash Incentive and Team Complementarity 
 
 
The Impact of Team Complementarity 
We continue by investigating effects of team complementarity to answer the question if 
individuals’ collaboration on an online platform will increase with the presence and increased 
effort of other participants (i.e., conditional cooperation). We start with a binary measure of 
individual activity: is an individual active (HoursWorked > 0) or not. We present our results of 
regression  analyses  of  team  complementarity  in  Error!  Reference  source  not  found..  All 
models use an individual’s skill rating as a control, which is statistically significant and positive 
in all models. All models also include counts of the number of time zones and the number of 
countries represented in each team as control measures for compositional team diversity. Models 
1 and 2 are logistic regressions using a dichotomous indicator of individual’s status as an active 
participant as dependent variable. Model 1 introduces the number of active team members as our 
main explanatory variable. We find a statistically significant and positive coefficient of .373 (p < 
.05). We find that an individual’s likelihood of being active increases by about 41% with each 
additional  active  teammate.  Model  2  introduces  GroupCashIncentive  as  an  additional 
5 Main Results: E↵ect of Prize on E↵ort and Communication
Table 1: OLS Regressions of Individual Activity on Cash Incentive and Team Complementarity.
Dependent variable: HoursWorked NumCommunications
(1) (2)
GroupCashIncentive 6.676⇤⇤⇤ 0.368
(2.233) (1.829)
Constant 5.782⇤⇤⇤ 3.007⇤
(1.189) (1.586)
Observations 260 260
Adjusted R2 0.042 -0.004
F Statistic (df = 1; 258) 12.283⇤⇤⇤ 0.078
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
6  19 
explanatory  variable,  which  is  not  statistically  significant.  This  provides  initial  support  for 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
Table 5. Individual Likelihood to be Active, Effort and Communication 
 
 
We find no evidence of direct complementarity across workers. As reported in Model 3, 
an individual worker’s effort does not increase significantly in the presence of high effort of 
other individuals in one’s own team. Introducing the number of communications of the four 
other members of a team, Model 4, shows the complementarity is not between effort choices per 
se; rather others’ communications positively shape individuals’ effort choices. The number of 
communications of the four other members shapes the effect, and the coefficient on the four 
others’  effort  goes  to  zero.  As  theorized  previously,  this  demonstrates  the  importance  of 
participants’  ability  to  observe  the  effort  levels  of  others;  when  effort  occurs  privately,  in 
absence of communication, it is not observable to non co-located team members. It should also 
be  noted  that  there  is  a  strong  association  between  effort  and  communications  choices: 
individuals who worked more tended to also communicate more — however, for the most part, 
this  relationship  would  appear  to  be  orthogonal  to  the  provision  of  cash  incentives.  This  is 
particularly strong evidence that while cash incentives are a potent motivator of effort, they do 
not encourage interactions or collaboration as such in this case, further supporting Hypothesis 3. 
Given the earlier finding of complementarities impacting effort, Model 5 then introduces 
the number of communications and hours worked of the other four individuals. Consistent with 
the earlier patterns, the complementarity is with observable communications of others rather than 
unobservable  effort  within  the  same  team.  This  is  not  surprising,  as  one  should  expect  that 
1 Compositional Diversity
Table 1: Regressions of Team Complementarity.
Dependent variable: Individual Likelihood to be Active HoursWorked NumCommunications
logistic OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of active members, Other 4 0.343⇤⇤ 0.312⇤
(0.164) (0.180)
GroupCashIncentive 0.294 4.601⇤⇤ 5.999⇤⇤⇤  0.670
(0.269) (2.208) (2.243) (1.359)
HoursWorked, Other 4 0.052  0.004 0.016
(0.037) (0.039) (0.026)
NumComms, Other 4 0.111⇤⇤⇤ 0.126⇤⇤⇤
(0.023) (0.015)
Controls
Skill Rating 0.829⇤⇤⇤ 0.816⇤⇤⇤ 2.875⇤⇤⇤ 2.556⇤⇤⇤ 2.119⇤⇤
(0.189) (0.189) (0.925) (0.870) (0.845)
NumTimeZones, Other 4 0.357⇤ 0.326 0.956 0.835 0.411
(0.190) (0.201) (1.315) (1.286) (0.568)
NumCountries, Other 4  0.285  0.275  0.810  0.496  1.143
(0.248) (0.255) (1.646) (1.692) (0.921)
Constant  0.936  0.950 4.709 3.914 4.033
(0.958) (0.961) (6.598) (6.973) (3.740)
Observations 260 260 260 260 260
Adjusted R2 0.068 0.091 0.172
Log Likelihood -160.471 -159.919
F Statistic 4.804⇤⇤⇤ 5.309⇤⇤⇤ 9.993⇤⇤⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
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communications tend to elicit reciprocating communications. It is not possible to statistically 
infer  the  direction  of  causality  but  it  stands  to  reason  the  effect  works  both  ways  with 
reciprocating interactions and communications.
4 
It  remains  plausible  from  these  results  that  individuals  who  work  harder  simply 
communicate  more,  and  it  is  the  communications  that  stimulate  effort  (rather  than  a  direct 
complementarity of communications along with a complementarity in effort). In principle, it 
should  be  difficult  to  discern  these  fine  distinctions,  given  both  communications  and  hours 
worked are endogenous and presumably chosen simultaneously by individuals as they interact 
with the team. However, introducing HoursWorked into the regression has negligible effect on 
the point estimates of coefficients on other’s posts. This is consistent with the interpretation of a 
direct complementarity acting across communications, along with communications stimulating 
effort (as earlier established). 
The Impact of Information Diversity and Temporal Coordination 
Having established basic evidence of team complementarity, we continue by investigating more 
closely the type of information shared within a team, i.e., information diversity, and the timing of 
those messages. For this analysis, we shift to the team level as our unit of analysis and we use 
Team Score as our dependent variable. We report OLS results with robust standard errors in  
Table 6. It is important to note that with this shift in level of analysis, the number of 
observations available to study consequently decreases from 260 to 52. We investigate if team 
performance on an online platform is driven by the information diversity characterizing team 
communications first. Model (1) begins by simply regressing our outcome measure, Team Score, 
on a set of control measures, including GroupCashIncentive, Rating, collective team output,
5 
number  of  team  messages  (NumCommunications),  number  of  time  zones,  and  number  of 
countries represented in each team. The average team score achieved by teams is 2,360. Of the 
control measures, only the measure of number of code submissions is statistically significant. 
This is consistent with prior research on tournaments allowing repeat entries (Wooten & Ulrich, 
2012) and adds to the results presented above on effort showing that increased effort does indeed 
lead to higher team performance. Each additional code submission increases the final team score 
by 145 points.  
 
Table 6. OLS Regression of Team Score on Information Diversity and Burstiness at the Team 
Level 
                                                 
4 The count of others’ communications might reflect an individual’s responses to team 
members, the team members’ responses to the individual, or more likely both. 
5 Alternative measures of team effort such as sum of hours works, or the use of both 
measures simultaneously do not substantively change our results.   21 
  
 
Model  (2)  introduces  our  measure  of  Information  Diversity,  which  is  statistically 
significant (p < .05) with a positive coefficient: a one standard deviation increase in Information 
Diversity corresponds to an increase in team score by 920 points. It is important to note that the 
regression controls for the total number of messages sent within a team. This supports H4.
6  
We continue by investigating temporal coordination of communication within teams as a 
predictor of team performance. Model (3) regresses our measure of Burstiness on team score, 
again controlling for total number of messages sent within a team. Burstiness is statistically 
significant  (p  <  .01)  and  positive,  with  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  Burstiness 
corresponding  to  1,090  points  increase  in  team  score.  Finally,  Model  (4)  introduces  both 
measures simultaneously. The measure of Information Diversity is not statistically significant 
while  Burstiness  is  statistically  significant  with  a  coefficient  of  comparable  size  as  in  the 
previous model (𝗽 = 947). In this case we find group coordination in communication (the timing 
aspect of messages), keeping the total number of messages and the information diversity of those 
messages constant, is the main determinant of group effectiveness, further supporting H5.  
   
                                                 
6  We  find  no  relationship  between  information  diversity  and  team  diversity  such  as 
number of represented countries in a team.  
Table 2: All models OLS.
Dependent variable: Team Score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Information Diversity 904.755⇤⇤ 396.674
(standardized) (458.167) (484.093)
Burstiness 698.388⇤⇤⇤ 582.794⇤⇤
(z-score) (235.807) (271.207)
Controls
GroupCashIncentive 212.640 333.495 311.864 348.427
(677.772) (676.218) (625.084) (642.663)
Rating 855.888 881.030 386.535 475.243
(1,028.078) (976.395) (940.228) (969.289)
Collective Team Output 156.822⇤⇤⇤ 126.224⇤⇤ 121.476⇤⇤ 113.912⇤⇤
(51.924) (52.145) (52.487) (53.904)
NumCommunications 3.370  4.437  18.821⇤⇤  18.571⇤
(7.318) (7.239) (9.438) (10.330)
NumTimeZones  502.527  468.066  472.959  462.744
(442.538) (404.488) (396.102) (388.603)
NumCountries 222.522 185.146 507.027 443.550
(418.412) (407.859) (365.631) (372.557)
Constant 3,164.884⇤ 3,625.930⇤⇤ 1,181.515 1,711.929
(1,775.792) (1,791.133) (1,428.084) (1,633.520)
Observations 52 52 52 52
Adjusted R2 0.510 0.544 0.578 0.575
F Statistic 9.855⇤⇤⇤ 9.677⇤⇤⇤ 10.996⇤⇤⇤ 9.630⇤⇤⇤
Note: ⇤p<0.1; ⇤⇤p<0.05; ⇤⇤⇤p<0.01
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explored factors determining the emergence of collaboration in online 
teams. Our approach considers (1) a perspective emphasizing the role of incentives in catalyzing 
effective work by teams; and (2) a perspective emphasizing more subtle social processes and 
interactions among team members to catalyze effective work by teams.  
Regarding  the  role  that  incentives  play  in  the  emergence  of  collaboration,  we  find 
considerable heterogeneity in individual’s willingness to participate and to exert effort both with 
and without cash incentives. We find that cash incentives had a sharp effect on online workers’ 
continuous choice of level of effort. Thus, despite the range of possible limitations of team-based 
cash  incentives,  clearly  cash  generated  a  sharp  difference  in  average  levels  of  activity.  A 
corollary to the doubling of effort in response to cash incentives is that half the level of effort 
was still achieved with no cash incentives at all. Further, the application of cash incentives also 
did not affect the probability of an individual taking the discrete decision to communicate—at 
all. This is consistent with a growing body of work on participation and motivations of workers 
in collaborative online contexts that points to the importance of non-cash based incentives and 
motivations(e.g.,  Roberts,  Hann,  &  Slaughter,  2006).  Although  cash  incentives  stimulated  a 
significant boost of effort per se, it is equally notable that they did not transform the nature of the 
work process or affect the level of collaboration, as proxied by team communications. The effect 
of cash incentives appears to be focused on the continuous decision of the level of effort to exert 
in this context. 
Regarding socially emergent processes, we find a number of patterns consistent with a 
highly socialized process of emergent interdependence. At a basic yet striking level, we observe 
that the likelihood that an individual chooses to participate depended on whether teammates were 
themselves active. We find that an individual’s likelihood of being active increases by about 
41% with each additional active teammate. Moreover, communications among teammates begot 
more communications and communications among teammates also stimulated greater continuous 
levels  of  effort  expenditures.  An  individual  worked  about  seven  minutes  more  with  each 
additional  communication  sent  by  a  team  member.  This  suggests  that  it  is  important  for 
communication  design  to  provide  observable  signals  about  the  fact  that  team  members  are 
actively working on the task at hand rather than free riding and slacking. Hence, providing 
adequate  communications  channels  to  make  the  efforts  of  others  visible  is  important  in  the 
design of systems for online work as it helps to confirm that others are actively contributing. 
Consistent with the existence of these social processes and their contribution to team 
performance in this context, we find problem-solving performance levels to be correlated with 
the range and diversity of information and topics exchanged in communications and the extent to 
which communications appear to be closely-spaced. This pattern of “bunched” communications 
is consistent with active interactions.  
The importance of these results regarding social processes underlines a fundamental role 
that teams are to play in this context—one of eliciting diverse contributions and ideas (Crawford 
& Haaland, 1972, Wuchty, Jones, & Uzzi, 2007, Uzzi et al., 2013). It appears that “effort” per se   23 
is not sufficient in delivering the transformation in work mode to fully capture this essential 
driver of team productivity in this context. Apart from eliciting these diverse contributions, there 
is  an  equally  important  challenge  of  harnessing,  channeling,  and  coordinating  these 
contributions. While the virtuous cycles documented here do not suggest these things can be 
understood as entirely independent mechanisms and processes, we see separate indication of the 
role of coordinated interactions in the correlation between team performance and the extent to 
which  team  members  concentrated  their  communication  and  work  effort  during  relatively 
contained time periods. This pattern of “bunched” team activity is consistent with active and 
deliberate interactions and “temporal coordination” (Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001). 
Important to emphasize in these results is the question of complementaries in behavior 
(as distinct from possible complementarities in knowledge). The complementarities across actors 
in a team were driven by reactions to communications in particular;  it is not that workers raise 
their efforts in response to others’ work and effort, per se, but rather that individuals raise their 
work efforts in relation to the level of communications of teammates. This again underlines the 
importance of the social interactive processes. At the same time, individuals’ communications 
increase in response to teammates’ communications. Thus, apart from communication leading to 
a qualitative transformation of work to involve more interactions, the patterns are consistent with 
the  virtuous  circle  of  interactions  themselves  driving  the  level  of  effort.  These  patterns  of 
reciprocating complementarities are consistent with the importance of setting productive social 
interactions  and  dynamics  into  motion  in  order  to  catalyze  collaboration  (Bettenhausen  & 
Murnighan,  1985,  Ginnett,  1993,  Ericksen  &  Dyer,  2004),  even  in  this  rather  weak  social 
context. 
These  patterns  distinguish  groups  in  which  there  is  simply  high  effort  from  those  in 
which there is true interdependence and emergent collaboration (Wageman & Gordon, 2005, 
Caruso & Woolley, 2008, Hackman, 2011) with the latter being the locus of true innovation in 
face-to-face  contexts.  In  drawing  this  bright  distinction  and  showing  its  implications,  these 
findings  might  also  be  judged  as  shedding  further  light  on  how  perspectives  on  incentives, 
predominant in economics, and perspectives on social processes and interactions, predominant in 
research on organizational behavior and teams, might be better understood.  
While our findings contribute to answering a number of questions about the initiation of 
collaboration in online environments, a number of questions for future research are suggested as 
well. Though participants were informed that they might be working in teams in this contest, 
most were not accustomed to working in this manner in a contest of this type. Thus we do not 
know if participants were self-selected for their level of interest in collaboration, and the degree 
to which this influences our findings. Future research should examine how the behavior of those 
who self-select into team collaboration differs from those who prefer to work individually to 
gauge how this would change the factors that are most influential to performance. In addition, 
while participants who were assigned to our "incentive" condition were eligible for a prize, none 
of our participants were directly paid for their effort. Thus the degree to which our findings   24 
would generalized to a setting in which salaried employees are paid for their time to work in an 
online platform is a matter that should also be examined in future research. 
The questions our study answers represent an important extension of the literature on 
online collaboration and team performance in a number of ways. First and foremost, the unique 
nature of this field experimental setting allows us to make stronger causal claims about the 
effects  of  cash  incentives  and  collaboration  on  performance  than  has  been  possible  in  prior 
studies. In particular, the finding that cash incentives do drive effort, yet do nothing to stimulate 
collaboration provides an important contribution to existing literature. Second, while the effects 
of incentives, information diversity, and temporal coordination have been studied independently 
in  prior  work,  our  ability  to  examine  their  independent  and  combined  effects  allows  us  to 
separate the factors affecting effort versus those that affect the quality of collaboration, and their 
relative contributions to performance. Third, the completeness of our observed data on the teams' 
collaboration as well as the high fidelity of our metrics of individual skills and team performance 
allows us to examine and control for important variables that are often treated as sources of error 
in more traditional field studies of team collaboration. Thus we are able to more precisely specify 
the effects of the team process variables and underscore their importance as a design principle 
for improving collaboration in online environments.  
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